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Introduction 
As communication nowadays commonly takes place via electronic means and online, the use 
of electronic evidence (e-evidence) is becoming a crucial element in criminal investigations. 
Due to the borderless nature of the internet, many criminal investigations that take place in the 
‘offline world’ include a cross-border dimension. They therefore commonly require access to 
electronic data and evidence that is stored outside the territorial jurisdiction of the investigating 
authority.  
Since these data are typically held by private companies that are often located in a different 
country than the investigator, law enforcement authorities (LEAs) are either dependent on the 
willingness of these service providers to cooperate on a voluntary basis in order to have the 
data available for investigations, or resort to existing legal procedures. The relevant procedures 
under the current framework to access data stored outside the European Union (EU) is based 
on so-called Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs), whereas judicial cooperation within 
the EU is, inter alia, governed by the Directive on the European Investigation Order (EIO) in 
the form of the national transposition acts.1 The latter aims to make cross-border investigations 
across the EU faster and more efficient by using several investigative measures with a view to 
gathering evidence on the basis of mutual recognition. MLATs on the other hand provide for 
domestic judicial review in both the requesting and the receiving state. This is one of the 
reasons why the current MLAT procedure is said to imply practical challenges, which have to 
do with a bemoaned slowness as different judicial authorities have to be involved, the alleged 
lack of efficiency and the legal uncertainty within the prevailing MLAT regime. 
Since electronic (=e-) evidence is, due to its volatile nature, prone to modification and deletion, 
timely acquisition of stored data is vital for LEAs. Therefore, informal cooperation between 
LEAs and private companies is a common method to obtain electronic evidence, thereby 
bypassing the Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) mechanisms. Thus, whereas under MLATs a 
request for access to data would be sent to a judicial authority in the receiving state, direct 
cooperation often entails the issuing of a domestic investigative measure by the LEA directly 
to the (foreign) service provider. Such informal cooperation between LEAs and foreign service 
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1 Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 regarding the European Investigation 
Order. This relatively recent EU instrument replaced the necessity to rely on the previous bi- or multilateral agreements as 
they apply still with non-EU-States.  
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providers has progressively become one important channel to obtain non-content data.2 This 
results in legal disputes about jurisdiction matters where the informal approach turns into a 
formal request. The tendency of state authorities to more proactively assert jurisdiction beyond 
their national borders in cyberspace, thereby bypassing the more time-consuming MLA 
procedures, implies that particularly service providers are increasingly confronted with conflict 
of laws concerns when they have to decide whether or not to comply with these requests.3 From 
the company perspective the orientation towards the legal framework of the country with 
traditional jurisdiction – typically the seat state – and especially data protection concerns under 
that legal regime lead to an understandable hesitation to comply with such requests on an 
informal level. Direct cooperation between law enforcement and private companies, which is 
commonly carried out on an unilateral basis, has led to a fragmented framework, inter alia, due 
to differences in the types of data requested, divergent procedures for submitting requests, 
unreliable outcomes and unpredictable response times.4 
Against this background, the European Commission (Commission), on 17 April 2018, 
proposed new rules on access to e-evidence and information, to secure and obtain e-evidence 
more quickly and effectively and to ensure that all providers that offer services in the Union 
are subject to the same obligations.5 The proposal includes a Regulation6 and a Directive7 that 
aim to develop a common framework for cooperation with service providers for the purposes 
of obtaining specific categories of data and to improve legal certainty and clarity. 
The proposed legal instruments must comply with the EU data protection acquis, consisting of 
Regulation (EU) 2016/6798 (GDPR), which applies to general processing of personal data, and 
Directive (EU) 2016/6809 (LED) that specifically covers processing in the law enforcement 
context. Thus, processing of personal data carried out by service providers will fall within the 
scope of the GDPR, whereas processing by law enforcement authorities for the purposes of the 
prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of crime will be governed by the rules of 
                                                          
2 Gavin Robinson, ‘Data Protection and the European Production Order for Electronic Evidence in Criminal Matters’ (Draft), 
May 2018; Vanessa Franssen, ‘The European Commission’s E-Evidence Proposal:Towards an EU-wide obligation for Service 
Providers to cooperate with Law Enforcement?’, European Law Blog, 12 October 2018; 
http://europeanlawblog.eu/2018/10/12/the-european-commissions-e-evidence-proposal-toward-an-eu-wide-obligation-for-
service-providers-to-cooperate-with-law-enforcement/.  
3 Cesare Bartolini, Cristiana Santos, Carsten Ullrich, ‘Property and the cloud’, Computer Law & Security Review: The 
International Journal of Technology Law and Practice (2017), doi: 10.1016/j.clsr.2017.10.005, p. 23. 
4 European Commission, ‘Non-Paper: Progress Report following the Conclusions of the Council of the European Union on 
Improving Criminal Justice in Cyberspace’ (‘Commission non-paper 1’), available via Council of the European Union, doc. 
15072/1/16 REV (7 December 2016), para 1.2.1. http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/st-15072-2016-init/en/pdf. 
5 European Commission “E-Evidence,” Migration and Home Affairs, February 7, 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/e-evidence_en. 
6 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European Production and Preservation Orders 
for electronic evidence in criminal matters, COM(2018) 225 final, Strasbourg, 17.4.2018. 
7 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down harmonised rules on the appointment of 
legal representatives for the purpose of gathering evidence in criminal proceedings, COM(2018) 226 final, Strasbourg, 
17.4.2018. 
8 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC 
[2016]OJ L 119, p. 1–88. 
9 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons 
with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, 
detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, 
and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, [2016] OJ L 119, p. 89–131. 
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the LED. The compliance of the new rules on access to e-evidence with the EU data protection 
acquis will be one of the relevant matters covered in this article. 
Meanwhile, similar developments concerning the adoption of legislative acts or other 
instruments regarding law enforcement access to data stored by private companies take place 
elsewhere. Exemplary for the area of Europe (and also beyond) the developments within the 
Council of Europe (CoE) can be mentioned and, because of the high relevance as far as IT 
companies are concerned, on an international level especially the United States of America. 
These developments will, together with the Commission’s proposals, be discussed below in 
order to put the proposals into a comparative perspective. 
This contribution will address concerns regarding the role of private companies as ‘extended 
arm’ of LEAs and discuss the impact of the proposals with regard to EU data protection 
standards. This will include looking at previous developments on EU level concerning a 
Directive that required telecoms operators to retain certain types of metadata for a long period 
from all customers and which was later quashed by the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU). Potential issues with regard to data protection rights need to be considered against the 
background whether there is a justified interest of LEAs to rely on effective measures to access 
data and to analyze personal data for investigation purposes. 
The article will briefly describe the current procedures for cross-border access to electronic 
evidence (section I.), illustrate the initiatives that are currently on the table at the level of the 
CoE (section II. 1)) as well as across the Atlantic in the U.S. (section II. 2)). Section III. will 
present the EU proposals on access to e-evidence and the specific data protection issues 
concerned by the proposal in section IV. The Conclusion will summarize the main findings and 
point to certain aspects that should be taken into account when similar measures on different 
levels are being adopted. 
 
I. Background: Mutual Legal Assistance and Mutual Recognition 
Traditionally, Mutual Legal Assistance refers to a mechanism that facilitates cooperation 
between states for the purposes of gathering and exchanging information. Such cooperation 
commonly serves to assist in the investigation or prosecution of criminal offences with a cross-
border dimension. Under MLA procedures, competent state authorities may request form 
another competent (foreign) state authority legal assistance by submitting a judicial decision 
that may be verified by the receiving state, which will then decide whether or not to comply 
with the request. 
In the EU, cooperation in criminal matters mainly developed with the introduction of the 
Schengen Area, but was progressively replaced by mutual recognition instruments.10 The 
principle of mutual legal assistance and, in the EU the principle of mutual recognition goes 
hand in hand and with mutual trust between the Member States. Moreover, mutual recognition 
requires a minimum harmonization of national laws, meaning that a criminal offence in one 
                                                          
10 European Commission, 'Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition', accessed June 2, 2018, 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/cross-border-cases/judicial-cooperation/types-judicial-cooperation/mutual-legal-assistance-and-
extradition_en. 
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Member States must also constitute a criminal offence in the other Member States. Likewise, 
for MLA, the approximation of national criminal procedural laws is prerequisite in order to 
prevent conflicts regarding minimum standards. 
The first European treaty on mutual legal assistance was the CoE’s European Convention on 
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, which was concluded on 20 April 1959.11 This 
Convention was supplemented with a Protocol of 17 March 197812 and a Protocol of 8 
November 2001.13 The Council of Europe is a separate international organisation from the 
European Union and has 47 Member States but also allows for some of its Conventions – which 
are opened for signature to states and sometimes international organisations – to be signed and 
ratified by non-Member States. This allows the reach of CoE instruments to go well beyond 
the geographical limits of Europe. On the other hand, it needs to be noted that the organisation 
works purely on the basis of public international law treaties, which do not enable it to 
implement by supranational force “law” directly on the states bound by the treaties. It is 
noteworthy that for the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) there is a specific 
court set up that allows individuals to take complaints against States based on a violation of 
ECHR provisions to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg. However, 
the jurisdiction of that Court is limited to the ECHR and does not cover any of the other CoE 
instruments such as the ones mentioned here. 
For the European Union (respectively the previous European Community) the establishment 
of the internal market in 1992 and the abolishment of the national borders within the Schengen 
Area in 199514 marked the beginning of closer cooperation in criminal matters among the EU 
Member States. Against that background, the Maastricht Treaty led to the creation of the so-
called ‘Third Pillar’, giving the EU limited competences to legislate in certain criminal 
matters.15 This pillar in those days was still an intergovernmental activity that had to rely on 
full support by all Member States, but in the meanwhile, with the entry into force of the Treaty 
of Lisbon in 2009, has been integrated fully into the only remaining pillar of the EU as 
supranational field of action. 
The EU Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of 
the European Union16, established by the Council Act of 29 May 2000 in accordance with 
Article 34 of the Treaty on European Union was the first MLA instrument on EU level. 
Supplementing the provisions of the CoE and its 1978 Additional Protocol17, the MLA 
                                                          
11 European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, ETS No.030, Strasbourg, 20 April 1959. 
12  The additional Protocol entered into force in Belgium on 29 May 2002 and in Luxembourg on 31 December 2000 
(http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=099&CM=8&DF=24/08/2014&CL=ENG). 
13  The second additional Protocol entered into force in Belgium on 1 July 2009 but has not yet been ratified by 
Luxembourg (http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=182&CM=8&DF=24/08/2014-
&CL=ENG). 
14 European Commission, ‘Schengen Area’, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-
visas/schengen_en.  
15 Sanja Glaser / Andreas Motz / Frank Zimmermann, ‘Mutual Recognition and its Implications for the Gathering of Evidence 
in Criminal Proceedings: A Critical Analysis of the Initiative for a European Investigation Order’, THEMIS 2010/Barcelona. 
16 Council Act of 29 May 2000 establishing in accordance with Article 34 of the Treaty on European Union the Convention 
on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union, O.J. C 197, 12 July 2000, 1 
(hereinafter: EU MLA Convention). This Convention was supplemented with a Protocol on 16 October 2001: O.J. 326, 21 
November 2001, 2. 
17 Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, ETS No.099, Strasbourg, 
17.03.1978. 
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Convention’s aim was to facilitate the application of those legal instruments, without affecting 
more favourable provisions in bilateral or multilateral agreements between Member States.18 
Unlike previous international MLA agreements, the EU MLA Convention contains explicit 
provisions on the interception of telecommunications.19 
Council Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA20 of 18 December 2008 established the European 
Evidence Warrant (EEW) for the purposes of obtaining objects, documents and data for use in 
proceedings in criminal matters in order to further enhance mutual assistance in the field of 
gathering evidence. It supplemented a Framework Decision from 2003 on the execution of 
orders freezing property and evidence in the European Union, which had been the first 
instrument that implemented the principle of mutual recognition in the field of obtaining 
evidence.21 
As mentioned above, the principle of mutual recognition builds on mutual trust between the 
Member States, as judicial decisions from one Member State shall be recognized in another 
Member State. Thus, under those instruments, legality, necessity and proportionality of a 
request are being verified by the authorities in the requesting Member State and do not have to 
pass additional procedures of recognition in the receiving Member State.22 
In 2009, the Lisbon Treaty codified the principle of mutual recognition under Articles 67 (3) 
and 82, the latter granting the European Parliament (EP) and the Council the power to adopt 
legislative acts to facilitate mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions under 
paragraph 2. 
Directive 2014/41/EU of 3 April 2014 regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal 
matters (EIO)23 is based on the principle of mutual recognition and aims to facilitate the 
gathering and transmission of evidence in criminal matters between the Member States. The 
EIO supplements the EEW by adding certain provisions and expanding its scope while 
maintaining some of the rules of the Framework Decision. Covering the entire process from 
the freezing of evidence to the transfer of existing evidence, the EIO’s main objective is to 
reduce the level of fragmentation for the gathering of evidence and to establish a more coherent 
instrument that is applicable to additional types of evidence.24 Moreover, it sets stricter 
deadlines to accept and answer requests, limits grounds for refusal of requests, and introduced 
                                                          
18 Art. 1 EU MLA Convention. The EU MLA Convention also supplements and repeals certain provisions on mutual assistance 
in criminal matters of the Convention of 19 June 1990 implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 (Art. 1 and 2 
(2) EU MLA Convention). 
19 Art. 17 to 22 EU MLA Convention. 
20 Council Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA of 18 December 2008 on the European evidence warrant for the purpose of 
obtaining objects, documents and data for use in proceedings in criminal matters O.J. 350, 30 December 2008, 72 (hereinafter: 
Framework Decision on the EEW). 
21 Sanja Glaser / Andreas Motz / Frank Zimmermann, ‘Mutual Recognition and its Implications for the Gathering of Evidence 
in Criminal Proceedings: A Critical Analysis of the Initiative for a European Investigation Order’, THEMIS 2010/Barcelona, 
p. 7. 
22 On the mutual recognition principle cf., among others, Ormazábal Sánchez, Espacio penal europeo y mutuo reconocimiento, 
2006; Jimeno Bulnes, European Law Journal 9 (2003), 614-630; Bujosa Vadell, Derecho penal supranacional y cooperación 
jurídica internacional, Cuadernos de Derecho Judicial XIII, 454; Gleß, ZStW 116 (2004), 353- 367; Peers, Common Law 
Market Review 41 (2004), 5. 
23 Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 regarding the European Investigation 
Order in criminal matters, O.J. 130, 1 May 2014, 1 (hereinafter: Directive on the EIO). 
24 Lorena Bachmaier Winter, ‘European investigation order for obtaining evidence in the criminal proceedings. Study of the 
proposal for a European directive’, in: Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik, No. 9/2010, p. 581. 
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a standard format to submit requests to overcome language barriers.25 The EIO marked a 
further step from the principle of MLA to mutual recognition in obtaining evidence taken by 
the European legislators. 
II. Cross-border access to data on the international level 
The idea of allowing access to data across borders has been discussed and developed not only 
within the European Union but also elsewhere on the international level. An early form of 
cooperation concerning “internet-related crime”, then so-called cybercrime, was the still highly 
relevant “Budapest Convention” (or Cybercrime Convention) of the CoE: the Convention on 
Cybercrime of 23 November 2001 and its Additional Protocol concerning specific forms of 
crimes such as dissemination of incitement to hatred. Also there have been discussions on the 
level of the CoE to supplement the Convention with a Second Additional Protocol concerning 
cross-border access and refining a specific article of the Convention. This process started 
before the EPO proposal of the European Commission for the European Union and will most 
likely finish after the agreement on the final version of the EPO. 
Below, the main elements of the Cybercrime Convention and further development in the CoE 
will be presented as well as an important international example for comparison – the U.S. 
approach for cross-border access to data is highly disputed there, too, as major IT companies 
storing data on European customers on EU territory have been requested to hand over such 
data to U.S. LEAs and a potentially ground-breaking case has been muted before the U.S. 
Supreme Court because of a recent related Act that was passed by Congress. 
1. The Situation in Europe apart from the European Union: Council of Europe  
a) The CoE Cybercrime Convention  
The CoE’s Budapest Convention on Cybercrime26 has been open for signature since 2001 and 
entered into force in July 2004.27 Until March 2018, 71 states, out of which 56 became parties 
to the Convention, signed it or were invited to accede.28 With an exception of Ireland and 
Sweden, the Cybercrime Convention has been ratified by all of the EU Member States.29 
Dealing with internet-enabled crimes, the Convention establishes international mechanisms for 
cooperation against cybercrime30 and obliges its members to set up procedures to acquire 
electronic evidence within a mutual legal assistance framework. In that context, parties to the 
                                                          
25 “European Commission Press Release, 'As of Today the ‘European Investigation Order’ Will Help Authorities to Fight 
Crime and Terrorism', accessed June 4, 2018, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1388_en.htm. 
26 Convention on Cybercrime, ETS No.185, Budapest, 23/11/2001. 
27 The Convention was so far ratified by 43 out of 47 Members of the Council of Europe (San Marino, Ireland, Russia and 
Sweden have not ratified it) and USA, Canada, Israel, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Japan, Mauritius, Panama, 
Senegal, Sri Lanka, Tonga and Australia. See: Paul de Hert, Cihan Parlar and Juraj Sajfert, ‘The Cybercrime Convention 
Committee’s 2017 Guidance Note on Production Orders: Unilateralist transborder access to electronic evidence promoted via 
soft law’, in: computer law & security review (2018), p. 2. 
28 CoE: Enhanced international cooperation on cybercrime and electronic evidence: Towards a Protocol to the Budapest 
Convention, Version 19 March 2018, p. 1. 
29 CoE, Chart of signatures and ratifications of Treaty 185 Convention on Cybercrime, status as of 30/05/2018. 
30 In the 2013 Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union, the Budapest Convention was recognized as the main multilateral 
framework for the fight against cybercrime - Joint Communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the 
European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on a Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe 
and Secure Cyberspace, JOIN(2013) 1 final. COM(2018) 225 final, p. 4. 
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Convention are required to introduce production orders and preservation orders, the former in 
order to either obtain data from service providers in their territory or subscriber data from 
service providers offering services in their territory, the latter in cases where there are grounds 
to believe that data is particularly prone to modification or deletion.31 Due to the challenges to 
enforce national production orders outside the territorial reach of members to the Convention, 
additional measures regarding cross-border access to e-evidence are currently being 
negotiated.32  
Article 18 of the Cybercrime Convention stipulates that parties to the Convention shall adopt 
measures to empower their competent authorities to issue production orders either against a 
person (Article 18.1.a.) or against a service provider offering its services in the territory of the 
party (Article 18.1.b.). With regard to a person in the territory of the party, the Explanatory 
Report states that a person would have to provide specified computer data stored in a computer 
system, or data storage medium that is in that person's possession or control.33 According to 
the Explanatory Report, Article 18.1.b. requires a service provider offering services in its 
territory to ‘submit subscriber information in the service provider’s possession or control’.34 
Article 32 of the Convention addresses international cooperation, in particular mutual 
assistance regarding investigative powers. The Article deals with unilateral trans-border 
searches where data are publicly available (Article 32.a. on trans-border access to publicly 
available (open source) stored computer data) or were data are disclosed on a voluntary basis 
(Article 32.b. on trans-border access with consent).35 
The relationship between Article 18 and Article 32 of the Cybercrime Convention is somewhat 
ambiguous, as Article 18 could be interpreted as including access to data stored abroad, since 
it refers to information in the service provider’s possession or control. Similarly, the wording 
‘offering services’ in the party’s territory could be understood as also covering data outside the 
territory of the state that is party to the Convention.36 
b) The Planned Second Additional Protocol to the Cybercrime Convention 
The so-called Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY) assesses the quality of national 
implementation acts of the Cybercrime Convention and considers solutions to challenges of 
criminal justice and the rule of law in cyberspace.37 From 2012 to 2017, two experts groups, 
the Working Group on transborder access to data and the Cloud Evidence Group38, were tasked 
                                                          
31 COM(2018) 225 final, p. 4. 
32 Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY) Preparation of a 2nd Additional Protocol to the Budapest Convention on 
Cybercrime, Discussion Guide for consultations with civil society, data protection authorities and industry, T-CY (2018)16, 
Strasbourg, 21 May 2018, p. 3. 
33 Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY) T-CY Guidance Note #10 Production orders for subscriber information (Article 
18 Budapest Convention), Adopted by the T-CY following the 16th Plenary by written procedure (28 February 2017), T-
CY(2015)16, Strasbourg, 1 March 2017, p. 4. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Paul de Hert, Cihan Parlar and Juraj Sajfert, ‘The Cybercrime Convention Committee’s 2017 Guidance Note on Production 
Orders: Unilateralist transborder access to electronic evidence promoted via soft law’, in: computer law & security review 
(2018), p. 3. 
36 Ibid, p. 7. 
37 CoE, ‘Enhanced international cooperation on cybercrime and electronic evidence: Towards a Protocol to the Budapest 
Convention’, Version 19 March 2018. 
38 See: https://www.coe.int/en/web/cybercrime/ceg.  
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to develop instruments to further regulate the trans-border access39 to data, the use of trans-
border investigative measures, and to explore solutions on criminal justice access to evidence 
stored on servers in the cloud and in foreign jurisdictions. 
In September 2016, the T-CY Cloud Evidence Group in its Recommendations on criminal 
justice access to data in the cloud recommended starting negotiations regarding an additional 
Protocol to the Cybercrime Convention. The objective of that protocol would be to facilitate 
direct cooperation with service providers in other jurisdictions by extending the scope of 
Article 32 of the Cybercrime Convention in order to allow for more effective mutual legal 
assistance.40 The provisions on more effective MLA would include the expedited disclosure of 
the identity and physical address of the subscriber of a specific IP address or user account41, 
would be applicable in situations where Article 18 is not applicable or cannot be enforced42, or 
where a service provider refuses to respond to domestic production orders from competent 
authorities43. 
Moreover, the possibility and scope of an international production order to be directly sent by 
the authorities of one party to the law enforcement authorities of another party44, and the 
establishment of joint investigation teams between the parties to the Convention as means for 
investigating transnational cases of cybercrime should be considered.45 According to the T-
CY, the latter option should also be available to states that are not parties to the Convention.46 
In order to avoid delays for responses to international requests, the anticipated Protocol to the 
Cybercrime Convention should also allow for requests to be sent in English47 and for 
emergency procedures concerning requests related to risks of life and similar exigent 
circumstances48. Further, the national legislation implementing Article 18 of the Cybercrime 
Convention should make data received from service providers admissible as evidence in 
criminal proceedings49, and trans-border access without consent but with lawfully obtained 
credentials, in good faith or in exigent or other circumstances50 should become an option. 
These considerations were discussed during the second meeting of the T-CY Protocol Drafting 
Group in February 2018, where the Group also welcomed the developments on EU level 
regarding electronic evidence and criminal justice in cyberspace. According to the Group, the 
drafting of the additional protocol should be closely coordinated with the relevant legal 
instruments by the European Union.51 
                                                          
39 Transborder Group, see: https://www.coe.int/en/web/cybercrime/tb.  
40 Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY), Criminal justice access to electronic evidence in the cloud:  Recommendations 
for consideration by the T-CY’, Final report of the T-CY Cloud Evidence Group, T-CY (2016)5, 16 September 2016 
Strasbourg, France, p. 49 at 106 and 107. 
41 Ibid., note 110. 
42 Ibid., note 111. 
43 Ibid., note 114. 
44 Ibid., note 115. 
45 Ibid., note 125. 
46 Ibid., note 126. 
47 Ibid., note 130. 
48 Ibid., note 134. 
49 Ibid., note 138. 
50 Ibid., note 144. 
51 Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY) Preparation of a 2nd Additional Protocol to the Budapest Convention on 
Cybercrime, Summary report of the 2nd Meeting of the T-CY Protocol Drafting Group (Strasbourg 31 January – 2 February 
2018), T-CY (2018)8, Strasbourg, 2 February 2018, p. 2. 
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2 The Situation in the United States of America  
a) The Microsoft Corp. v. United States Case 
In 2013, Microsoft, an U.S. incorporated and headquartered multinational technology 
company, received a warrant from the U.S. Government, requiring the disclosure of email 
content of a user’s email account hosted by Microsoft. The warrant established probable cause 
on the assumption that the user conducted criminal drug activity via that email account. The 
warrant was issued under 18 U.S.C. 2703 of the Stored Communications Act (SCA)52, 
requiring Microsoft to produce ‘information associated with’ the email account that was ‘stored 
at premises owned, maintained, controlled, or operated by Microsoft Corporation’.53 
While Microsoft disclosed the account identification records data stored on American servers, 
it did not provide email content data that was stored at a Microsoft data center in Dublin, 
Ireland. Microsoft argued that the Government’s warrant did not cover information stored 
outside the United States54 and decided to ‘quash the warrant to the extent that it direct[ed] the 
production of information stored abroad’.55 The argument brought by Microsoft was that the 
information sought by the U.S. Government was based on the SCA, according to which the 
issued warrant would have to use ‘the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure’.56 According to Rule 41 of the SCA ‘[f]ederal courts are without authority to issue 
warrants for the search and seizure of property outside the territorial limits of the United 
States’.57 
In May 2014, a federal magistrate judge rejected Microsoft’s non-compliance to provide the 
data and ordered Microsoft to produce the requested emails, holding that an SCA warrant is 
similar to a subpoena and, therefore, not bound by territoriality. As Microsoft had control over 
the material outside of the U.S., the court argued that the company must nevertheless comply 
with the SCA warrant.58 
The judgment was reviewed by the District Court of the Southern District of New York, which 
upheld the magistrate judge’s ruling. On appeal, the Second Circuit, however, decided to 
revoke the warrant ‘insofar as it demands user content stored outside of the United States’.59 
Following the Second Circuit’s judgment, U.S. Department of Justice filed for review of the 
Microsoft case, submitting a Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court after a rehearing en 
banc had not been granted. The Government held that disclosure of the data would occur in the 
                                                          
52 Stored Communications Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712. 
53 'United States v Microsoft Corp Gets a Supreme Court Hearing,' Constitutional Law Reporter, October 26, 2017, 
https://constitutionallawreporter.com/2017/10/26/united-states-v-microsoft-2017-2/. 
54 'The US v. Microsoft Supreme Court Case Has Big Implications for Data | WIRED,' accessed June 5, 2018, 
https://www.wired.com/story/us-vs-microsoft-supreme-court-case-data/. 
55 In re Warrant, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 468. 
56 Id. at 470 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012)); see also id. (outlining Microsoft’s argument). 
57 Id. Rule 41 vests no authority in magistrate judges to issue warrants for foreign searches. See, e.g., In re Terrorist Bombings 
of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 157, 171 (2d Cir. 2008) (expressing skepticism that judges can issue warrants for 
overseas searches). Foreign searches are instead subject to a reasonableness test that, in the Second Circuit, balances the 
intrusion on the individual’s privacy against the government interest in the search. See id. at 172. In: “In Re Warrant to Search 
a Certain Email Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp.,” accessed June 5, 2018, 
https://harvardlawreview.org/2015/01/in-re-warrant-to-search-a-certain-email-account-controlled-maintained-by-microsoft-
corp/. 
58 Electronic Privacy Information Center, “EPIC - United States v. Microsoft,” accessed June 5, 2018, 
https://www.epic.org/amicus/ecpa/microsoft/. 
59 Center. 
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United States and therefore, constitute a permissible domestic application of the SCA.60 On 16 
October 2017, the Supreme Court granted the Government’s petition. 
The international interest in the Microsoft case was observable by the number of amicus briefs 
that were filed with the Supreme Court in support of Microsoft. The signatories included 
European lawmakers, Members of Congress, leading technology companies, media 
organizations, legal scholars, computer scientists, trade associations and advocacy groups.61 In 
addition, several Governments, the European Commission, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the 
Right to Privacy, officials from law enforcement, intelligence and national security bodies, as 
well as E-discovery practitioners submitted further amicus briefs. 
While the Microsoft case was still pending, the California Northern District court decided a 
similar case62, in which Google was asked to provide user data stored on servers outside the 
U.S., again under an SCA warrant, but came to a different conclusion. The court adopted the 
holdings of the dissenting judges in the Microsoft case, arguing that the warrant would presume 
domestic application of the SCA. According to the court, Google had to comply with the 
warrant, regardless of where the data sought were stored, since the warrant was addressed to 
individuals at Google’s U.S. Headquarters who were responsible for the data.63 
Meanwhile, and before the Microsoft case was heard, On March 23, 2018, the U.S. Congress 
passed and the President signed the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act, 
which amended the SCA.64 According to the U.S. Government, the CLOUD Act resolved the 
question presented in the Microsoft case by specifying that a service provider responding to an 
SCA order must produce information within its ‘possession, custody, or control, regardless of 
whether such information is located within or outside of the United States’.65 Under the 
CLOUD Act, the U.S. Government obtained a new warrant, and was now able to argue that 
Microsoft’s sole objection, that the prior warrant was impermissibly extraterritorial, no longer 
applied.66 With the entry into force of the U.S. CLOUD Act, the Microsoft case was mooted.67 
b) The U.S. CLOUD Act 
The U.S. CLOUD Act was signed on 23rd March 2018, essentially creating an alternative 
mechanism to obtain data outside the scope of MLATs. The CLOUD Act allows U.S. law 
enforcement authorities to require service providers to preserve or disclose communications 
data of their users that is stored outside U.S. territory. 
Under Section 2523 of the CLOUD Act, the United States may enter into executive 
agreements68 with qualifying foreign governments in order to directly access data held by U.S. 
                                                          
60 “US v. Microsoft Litigation Provides the Supreme Court with a Rare Opportunity to Further Clarify and Define the Role of 
Comity in International Discovery Disputes,” JD Supra, accessed June 8, 2018, https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/us-v-
microsoft-litigation-provides-the-81750/. 
61 For a complete list of signatories, see: https://blogs.microsoft.com/datalaw/wp 
content/uploads/sites/149/2018/01/Complete-List-of-Amici-Signatories_FINAL-4.pdf.  
62 In re Search Warrant No. 16-960-M-01 to Google. 
63 On this  cf. also Cesare Bartolini, Cristiana Santos, Carsten Ullrich, ‘Property and the cloud’, Computer Law & Security 
Review: The International Journal of Technology Law and Practice (2017), doi: 10.1016/j.clsr.2017.10.005, p. 23.  
64 As part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, H.R. 1625, Div. V, 115th Cong., 2d Sess. (2018). 
65 Motion to vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case with Directions to dismiss as moot. On writ of 
certiorari to the United States of Appeals for the Second Circuit Motion. No. 17-2, March 2018, p. 2. 
66 Ibid. 
67 'United States v. Microsoft Corporation,' Oyez, accessed June 5, 2018, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-2. 
68 To qualify for an agreement the US Attorney General must determine that a candidate country’s domestic law affords robust 
substantive and procedural protections for privacy and civil liberties, based on open criteria, including respect for the rule of 
law and principles of non-discrimination; respect for international universal human rights (eg. protection from arbitrary and 
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technology companies in these contracting countries.69 The foreign governments would be able 
to conclude such agreements by way of certification issued by the U.S. Attorney General, after 
a certain assessment of their fundamental rights standards.70 
It is thereby mainly private companies that are involved in approving requests. Thus, a request 
would be directly submitted to the provider (Facebook, Microsoft, Google, etc.), which might 
handle those requests differently, depending on size and resources of the provider. This process 
could eliminate many safeguards that were established under the MLATs procedures, such as 
the approval of the request or the review of evidence. 
Under the CLOUD Act, a provider of electronic communication services may file a motion to 
modify or quash a request where the provider believes that the customer or subscriber is not a 
U.S. person or does not reside in the U.S. and, where the provider is of the opinion that the 
required disclosure would create a material risk that the provider would violate the laws of a 
foreign government.71  
This means that U.S. LEAs could request access to ‘the contents of a wire or electronic 
communication and any record or other information’ without having to comply with EU data 
protection standards, where the U.S. entered into an executive agreement with the EU, if there 
is no material risk of violation. 
The review mechanisms of certified countries under the CLOUD Act are questionable: Where 
a country entered into an agreement with the U.S., the withdrawal of the certification would be 
nearly impossible and review of the standards in the certified country would only take place on 
a 5-year basis. This could become problematic with regard to countries in which the political 
situation is unstable or that have low human rights standards in place. 
III. The Proposal for a EU Regulation European Preservation / Production orders 
As has been shown above, there is a general trend towards extending jurisdiction 
extraterritorially when it comes to accessing electronic evidence. The question of preserving 
data and granting access to it for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or 
prosecution of crime has been addressed on various occasions during the past years in the EU.  
                                                          
unlawful interference with privacy; fair trial rights; freedoms of expression, association and peaceful assembly; prohibitions 
on arbitrary arrest and detention; and prohibitions against torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment); 
clear legal mandates and procedures governing those entities of the foreign government that are authorised to seek data under 
the executive agreement, including procedures through which those authorities collect, retain, use, and share data, and effective 
oversight of those activities; sufficient mechanisms to provide accountability and appropriate transparency regarding the 
government’s collection and use of electronic data; and a commitment to promote and protect the global free flow of 
information and the open, distributed, and interconnected nature of the Internet. See: US Department of Justice, Legislation to 
Permit the Secure and Privacy-Protective Exchange of Electronic Data for the Purposes of Combating Serious Crime Including 
Terrorism, July 15, 2016, (‘DoJ Bill’), p. 2. 
69 'CLOUD Act: Civil Society Urges US Congress to Consider Global Implications,' EDRi (blog), March 19, 2018, 
https://edri.org/cloud-act-letter-uscongress-global-implications/. 
70 Katitza Rodriguez, 'The U.S. CLOUD Act and the EU: A Privacy Protection Race to the Bottom', Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, April 9, 2018, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/04/us-cloud-act-and-eu-privacy-protection-race-bottom. 
71 §2713 (2)(A), Motions to quash or modify. 
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1. From Data Retention to other EU Instruments concerning e-Evidence 
For instance, the EU Data Retention Directive72 required telecommunications providers to 
retain certain data of their users from 6 months up to 24 months in order to grant law 
enforcement access for crime prevention and investigation purposes. Eight years after its 
adoption in 2006, the Directive was quashed in the Digital Rights Ireland73 judgment by the 
CJEU, which held that the indiscriminate retention of personal data was disproportionate and 
in violation with Articles 7, 8 and 52(1) of the EU Charter. That argument was later upheld in 
the Tele2/Watson74 judgment, where the Court declared that only targeted data retention 
measures would be permissible and law enforcement access to retained data could solely be 
granted for the purpose of fighting serious crime and would have to follow prior judicial 
authorization.75 
Yet, the growing importance of obtaining electronic evidence for law enforcement purposes 
has, despite the CJEU’s strict approach in the above judgments, been addressed by various 
initiatives, inter alia, the Commission’s 2018 Work Programme76. That program suggests to 
finalize guidance for Member States on new possibilities for data retention after Digital Rights 
Ireland and Tele / Watson and to introduce measures to facilitate cross border access by law 
enforcement authorities to electronic evidence.77 
As previously mentioned, within the EU, the use of MLA mechanisms that traditionally govern 
transnational cooperation, gradually shifted towards mutual recognition of judicial decisions, 
a procedure, which has most recently been codified in the Directive on the European 
Investigation Order. An EIO is a judicial decision, which has been issued or validated by one 
Member State to have one or several specific investigative measure(s) carried out in another 
Member State to obtain (electronic) evidence.78 The EIO entered into force on 22 May 201779, 
but was already at that time transcended by new motions on how to improve the means for law 
enforcement to obtain access to e-evidence. 
                                                          
72 Directive 2006/24/EC on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available 
electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58, OJ, L 105/54, 
13.4.2006. 
73 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd (C-293/12) and Seitlinger (C-594/12), 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:238, 8 April 2014. EDPL 
74 Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15, Tele2 Sverige AB (C-203/15) and Watson (C-698/15), ECLI:EU:C:2016:970, 21 
December 2016. EDPL Cole/Quintel, ‘“Is there anybody out there?” –Retention of Communications Data: Analysis of the 
status quo in light of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) Carolina Academic Press Global Papers Series (forthcoming 2019). 
75 On the ground-breaking judgment of the CJEU declaring the Data Retention Directive void cf. Franziska Boehm and Mark 
D. Cole, 'Data Retention after the Judgement of the Court of Justice of the European Union', study for the Greens/EFA Group 
in the European Parliament. Münster/Luxembourg, 30 June 2014, especially concerning measures such as PNR and border 
control, p. 73 et seq., 89 et seq., 101 et seq., available at http://www.janalbrecht.eu/fileadmin/material/Dokumente/Boehm-
Cole-data_retention-study-printlayout.pdf. On the further development Cole/Quintel, ‘“Is there anybody out there?” –
Retention of Communications Data: Analysis of the status quo in light of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) Carolina Academic Press Global Papers Series 
(forthcoming). For more recent relevant case law (Opinion 1/15) see also Cole/Quintel, ‘Data Retention under the Proposal 
for an EU Entry/Exit System (EES): Analysis of the impact on and limitations for the EES by Opinion 1/15 on the EU/Canada 
PNR Agreement of the Court of Justice of the European Union legal Opinion for the Greens/EFA Group (European Parliament) 
76 Commission Work Programme 2018: An agenda for a more united, stronger and more democratic Europe, COM(2017) 650 
final, Strasbourg, 24.10.2017. 
77 COM(2017) 650 final, Strasbourg, 24.10.2017, p. 8. 
78 Article 1(1) of the EIO Directive. 
79 See: European Commission Press Release, ‘As of today the "European Investigation Order" will help authorities to fight 
crime and terrorism, Brussels, 22 May 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1388_en.htm-  
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2. The development of a specific e-Evidence Proposal 
In June 2016, three months after the terrorist attacks in Brussels, the Council adopted 
conclusions on improving criminal justice in cyberspace, requesting the Commission to deliver 
reports on the progress made with regard to improving cooperation with service providers, 
streamlining MLA and mutual recognition proceedings and reviewing the rules on enforcement 
of jurisdiction in cyberspace.80 
With regard to enhancing the cooperation with service providers, the Council requested the 
Commission to ‘develop a common framework for cooperation with service providers for the 
purpose of obtaining specific categories of data, in particular subscriber data, when allowed by 
third countries’ legislation, or any other comparable solution that allows for a quick lawful 
disclosure of such data’.81 To that end, the Commission was tasked to explore possibilities to 
use aligned tools to ensure swift procedures and to increase transparency and accountability of 
the process of securing and obtaining e-evidence.82 
In a non-paper from December 2016, the Commission acknowledged that Member States and 
their judicial and law enforcement authorities had taken diverging approaches regarding 
investigatory measures granting access to e-evidence.83 According to the Commission, the 
systematic use of MLA for all types of access requests for electronic evidence was increasingly 
viewed as problematic and time-consuming.84 Consequently, and despite the efforts to achieve 
enhanced cooperation through mutual recognition, there had been a further shift from applying 
MLA mechanisms towards the use of informal channels between LEAs and (foreign) service 
providers to obtain electronic evidence.85  
After an additional non-paper86, during public consultations87 and the issuing of an Inception 
impact Assessment, the Commission proposed, on 17 April 2018, new rules to facilitate access 
to e-evidence by police and judicial authorities. The proposal comprises a Regulation for the 
launch of European Production Orders (EPO) and European Preservation Orders (EPrO) and a 
Directive to oblige service providers offering services in the EU to designate a legal 
representative in the Union who would receive such orders from LEAs.88 The proposal was 
tabled by the European Commission, having the exclusive competence for initiating legislative 
                                                          
80 Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on improving criminal justice in cyberspace (9 June 2016) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-
trafficking/council_conclusions_on_improving_criminal_justice_in_cyberspace_en.pdf> accessed on 11/06/2018. 
81 Ibid., p. 3. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Non-paper: Progress Report following the Conclusions of the Council of the European Union on Improving Criminal Justice 
in Cyberspace, 15072/1/16 REV 1, Brussels, 7 December 2016, p. 4. 
84 Ibid, p. 5. 
85 Katalin Ligeti and Gavin Robinson, ‘Transnational Enforcement of Production Order for Electronic Evidence: Beyond 
Mutual Recognition?, in:Robert Kert and Andrea Lehner (eds.) Vielfalt des Strafrechts im internationalen Kontext – Festschrift 
für Frank Höpfel zum 65. Geburtstag (2018), p. 626. 
86 Non-Paper of the EU Commission services of June 2017, Improving Cross-border Access to Electronic Evidence: Findings 
from the Expert Process and Suggested Way Forward (‘Commission non-paper 2’). 
87 Public consultation on improving cross-border access to electronic evidence, see 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/consultations/public-consultation-improving-cross-border-access-electronic-evidence-
criminalmatters_ 
en> accessed 21 August 2017. 
88 European Commission, ‘E-evidence-cross-border access to electronic evidence. Improving cross-border access to electronic 
evidence’, https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/criminal-justice/e-evidence-cross-border-access-
electronic-evidence_en.  
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procedures in the European Union. It is now discussed both within the competent committees 
of the EP and within the Council of the European Union, which represents the 28 Member 
States. Typically, the legislative procedures continue with a common position developed by 
the Council and the EP signaling the changes they would like to see being made to the original 
proposal. This is then followed by a so-called trilogue, in which the Commission moderates 
between the positions of EP and Council to reach an agreement that is then formally confirmed 
by the plenary of the Parliament and the Council sitting in the relevant composition, before 
being published in the Official of the EU.  
The following section will briefly describe the main features of the e-evidence proposals and 
address those provisions that could have an (negative) impact on EU data protection standards. 
3. The Proposal for a Regulation and Directive 
The e-evidence proposal lays down the rules under which competent judicial authorities in the 
European Union may order a service provider offering services in the Union to produce or 
preserve electronic evidence through European Production Orders (EPOs) or European 
Production Orders (EPrOs).89 The Regulation would be applicable in all cases where the 
service provider is established or represented in a Member State other than the requesting 
Member State90, thus, not to domestic procedures. The service providers covered by the 
Regulation are required to comply with production or preservation orders for electronic 
evidence, regardless of the location where the requested data are stored.91 
The legal basis of the proposed Regulation is Article 82(1) TFEU, which relates to measures 
on judicial cooperation that may be adopted92 to lay down rules and procedures for ensuring 
recognition of all forms of judgments and judicial decisions throughout the Union and to 
facilitate cooperation between judicial or equivalent authorities.93 According to the 
Commission proposal, that Article also applies where a judicial authority in the issuing State 
addresses a legal person in another Member State, for instance when imposing obligations on 
it, regardless of whether a judicial authority in the other Member State is involved in the 
process.94 However, when a production or preservation order is issued, a judicial authority 
needs to be involved as either issuing or validating authority.95 Moreover, the judicial authority 
of the State executing the preservation or production order may intervene when necessary to 
enforce the decision.96 Yet, whether the production orders envisaged under the EPO proposal, 
which would oblige service providers to directly transmit electronic evidence, constitute 
judicial cooperation within the scope of Article 82(1) TFEU is debatable.97 
                                                          
89 Recital (15) of the e-evidence proposal, COM(2018) 225 final, Strasbourg, 17.4.2018. 
90 Recital (15) of the e-evidence proposal, COM(2018) 225 final, Strasbourg, 17.4.2018. 
91 Article 1(1) of the e-evidence proposal, COM(2018) 225 final, Strasbourg, 17.4.2018. 
92 By the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure. 
93 In relation to proceedings in criminal matters and the enforcement of decisions. COM(2018) 225 final, Strasbourg, 
17.4.2018, p. 5. 
94 Ibid. 
95 COM(2018) 225 final, Strasbourg, 17.4.2018, p. 16. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Katalin Ligeti and Gavin Robinson, ‘Transnational Enforcement of Production Order for Electronic Evidence: Beyond 
Mutual Recognition?, in:Robert Kert and Andrea Lehner (eds.) Vielfalt des Strafrechts im internationalen Kontext – Festschrift 
für Frank Höpfel zum 65. Geburtstag (2018), p. 642. 
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The accompanying Directive obliges those service providers covered by the Regulation to 
designate a legal representative for the receipt of, compliance with and enforcement of 
decisions and orders issued for the purposes of gathering evidence in criminal proceedings.98 
Pursuant to Article 8 of the proposed Regulation, a European Production Order is implemented 
where the requesting authority issues a European Production Order Certificate (EPOC) or a 
European Preservation Order Certificate (EPOC-PR). Under Article 7 of the proposal, both 
EPOCs and EPOC-PRs shall be addressed to the designated legal representative, who will be 
responsible for the reception and the timely and complete execution of an order.99 In case of 
urgency, if the legal representative does not comply with an order, or where no legal 
representative has been appointed, orders may be addressed to any establishment of the service 
provider in the Union.100 
The personal scope of the proposal applies to providers of electronic communications 
services101 and information society services for which the storage of data is a defining 
component of the service provided to the user.102 Moreover, Article 2(3)(c) includes internet 
domain name and IP numbering services103 under the definition of service provider. 
The scope of the proposed Regulation solely covers production and preservation orders that 
are issued during the pre-trial and trial phases of criminal proceedings, also covering legal 
persons, which may be held liable for criminal offences in the issuing State.104 
IV. Data protection regime under the EPO 
1. Relevant rules in the proposal 
Processing of personal data under the EPO Regulation will have to take into account the 
relevant data protection acquis, consistent of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
and the Data Protection Directive for Police and Criminal Justice Authorities (LED). The 
GDPR entered into application on 25 May 2018, while the LED had to be transposed by the 
Member States by 6 May 2018. The scope of the GDPR covers general processing activities 
by private and public bodies, while the Directive only applies when processing is carried out 
by competent authorities within the meaning of Article 3(7) LED for the purposes of the 
prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences. 
Thus, while the processing of personal data by service providers falls within the scope of the 
GDPR, competent LEAs will have to apply the LED when processing personal data for law 
enforcement purposes. Being applicable for both cross-border and domestic processing105, the 
                                                          
98 European Commission Press Release, ‘Security Union: Commission facilitates access to electronic evidence’, Brussels, 17 
April 2018, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-3343_en.htm.  
99 COM(2018) 225 final, Strasbourg, 17.4.2018, p. 17 and 18. 
100 Ibid, Article 7(2), (3) and (4) of the e-evidence proposal, COM(2018) 225 final, Strasbourg, 17.4.2018. 
101 As defined in Article 2(4) of the proposed Directive establishing the European Electronic Communications Code, see 
Article 2(3)(a) of the e-evidence proposal, COM(2018) 225 final, Strasbourg, 17.4.2018. 
102 As defined in point (b) of Article 1(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/1535, see Article 2(3)(b) of the e-evidence proposal, 
COM(2018) 225 final, Strasbourg, 17.4.2018. 
103 Such as IP address providers, domain name registries, domain name registrars and related privacy and proxy services. 
104 Article 2(3) of the e-evidence proposal, COM(2018) 225 final, Strasbourg, 17.4.2018. 
105 The Directive’s predecessor, Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, was only applicable to cross-border processing of 
personal data in the law enforcement sector. 
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LED harmonizes the national laws in respect of the exchange of information between police 
and judicial authorities, whilst leaving certain discretion to the Member States. 
However, due to the specific field in which the LED applies, processors are granted more 
flexibility, for instance with regard to data subjects’ right to information. Thus, where 
notification would jeopardize ongoing investigations, processors may refrain from informing 
data subjects that their data are being processed.106 
This logic is being reiterated under Article 11(1) of the EPO proposal, which stipulates that 
service providers shall ‘[…] refrain from informing the person whose data is being sought 
under an EPO in order not to obstruct the relevant criminal proceedings’. In accordance with 
Article 11(2), the issuing authority shall inform the data subject concerned about the production 
of his or her data107, but may delay notification as long as this is necessary and proportionate 
to avoid obstructing the relevant criminal proceedings. 
Article 11, the only Article concerned with data protection under the proposal, therefore is in 
line with Article 23 of the GDPR and Article 13 of the LED, albeit being less specific. Article 
23 GDPR provides that controllers or processors may restrict data subject rights to safeguard 
the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of 
criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public 
security, whereas Article 13 LED refers to data subjects’ right to information in the law 
enforcement context. 
The task of imposing restrictions due to criminal proceedings is, therefore, conferred upon the 
service provider, or the designated addressee. In line with Article 13(1) of the LED, competent 
authorities issuing EPOs shall make available information regarding the identity of the 
controller, the purposes of the processing, the right to access, rectification and erasure, and 
information about available legal remedies. However, under the EPO proposal, information 
shall only be provided in the case of production orders, as preservation orders are, according 
to the Commission, less intrusive.108 
2. Types of data and involvement of authorities when issuing and validating orders 
The EPO proposal differentiates between subscriber data, access data, transactional data and 
content data.109 EPOCs and EPOC-PRs for all data may be issued by a judge, a court, the 
competent prosecutor in the case concerned, or by any other competent authority as defined by 
the issuing State.110 However, the Commission argues that, due to the different level of 
intrusiveness between subscriber data and access data on the one hand and transactional and 
content data on the other, different conditions for issuing EPOCs or EPOC-PRs should be 
applied.111 
In line with that argument, recital 23 of the proposal determines that ‘[a]ll data categories 
contain personal data, and are thus covered by the safeguards under the Union data protection 
                                                          
106 Article 13(3) of Directive (EU) 2016/680. 
107 Where the service provider has not already informed the data subject. 
108 COM(2018) 225 final, Strasbourg, 17.4.2018, p. 20. 
109 Under Article 2(7), (8), (9) and (10), COM(2018) 225 final, Strasbourg, 17.4.2018. 
110 Article 4(a) and (b) of the e-evidence proposal, COM(2018) 225 final, Strasbourg, 17.4.2018. 
111 COM(2018) 225 final, Strasbourg, 17.4.2018, p. 5. 
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acquis, but the intensity of the impact on fundamental rights varies, in particular between 
subscriber data and access data on the one hand and transactional data and content data on 
the other hand’. 
Thus, while orders to produce subscriber data or access data may be issued for all criminal 
offences, in case of transactional data or content data, orders are limited under Article 5(4)(a) 
(b) and (c) to criminal offences punishable by a sentence of at least three years or a criminal 
offence listed in relevant EU legislation.112 Moreover, for EPOCs of transactional and content 
data, review by a court or an investigating judge is required, whereas production orders for 
subscriber and access data may also be issued and validated by the competent prosecutors in 
the Member States.113 Preservation orders may be issued and validated by a judge, a court, the 
prosecutor competent in the case, or another competent national authority. For preservation 
orders, no differentiation is made between different types of data.114 
The attribution of different standards to different types of data under the EPO proposal are 
questionable, firstly with regard to the differentiation in general, and, secondly, with regard to 
the case law of the CJEU. In its relevant judgments concerning data retention115, the Court held 
that all data must be equally protected, but their intrusiveness depends on a case-by case 
analysis. 
Thus, while content data might (and this is indeed debatable) be more intrusive regarding the 
privacy of persons, both types of data nevertheless require the same protection under EU data 
protection law (unless these data are special categories of data, in which case they require 
additional safeguards). Moreover the CJEU in Tele2/Watson held that ‘[traffic and location 
data] taken as a whole, is no less sensitive, having regard to the right to privacy, than the actual 
content of communications’.116 
Consequently, the categorization into different types of data in the manner that it was done 
under the EPO proposal might not be fully in line with the CJEU case law. 
3. Involvement of judicial authorities 
Pursuant to Article 9 of the EPO proposal, the addressee of the order, thus, the service 
provider’s legal representative, shall ensure that the requested data is transmitted directly to the 
issuing authority. The deadline for transmission is ten days upon receipt, or six hours in case 
of emergency. The proposal provides for various grounds for non-compliance with orders. 
Where an EPOC is incomplete, if the addressee cannot comply with its obligation because of 
force majeure, the data has been deleted, or if the order manifestly violates the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the addressee shall inform the issuing authority 
and ask for clarification.117 In such cases, the requested data shall be preserved until production 
is possible whether on the basis of a clarified EPOC or through other channels, such as MLA.118 
                                                          
112 Council Framework Decision 2001/413/JHA, Directive 2011/93/EU, Directive 2013/40/EU and Directive (EU) 2017/541. 
113 Article 4 (1) and (2) of the e-evidence proposal, COM(2018) 225 final, Strasbourg, 17.4.2018. 
114 Article 4(3) of the e-evidence proposal, COM(2018) 225 final, Strasbourg, 17.4.2018. 
115 For instance, Digital Rights Ireland or Tele2/Watson. 
116 Tele2/Watson para 99. 
117 Article 9(3), (4), (5) of the e-evidence proposal, COM(2018) 225 final, Strasbourg, 17.4.2018. 
118 Article 9(6) of the e-evidene proposal, COM(2018) 225 final, Strasbourg, 17.4.2018. 
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As a side note, the EPO proposal does not provide for data retention periods, and it should 
therefore be assumed that data will be retained in accordance with the storage limitation 
principle, enshrined under Article 5(1)(e) GDPR. 
During all these steps, no judicial authority in the issuing Member State would be required to 
intervene, as would be the case for traditional MLA procedures or executing requests for 
judicial cooperation. Consequently, the EPO proposal endorses a problem-oriented approach, 
where MLA processes and the Directive on the EIO could not solve the issues relating to access 
to electronic evidence. 
Conclusion  
In a world where criminals are using modern communication techniques, timely access to 
electronic evidence is necessary, as stored data is prone to deletion or modification. Moreover, 
most investigations include a cross-border dimension and MLAT agreements are often 
outdated and too slow. Effective mechanisms to secure and obtain digital evidence are crucial 
for investigations that involve volatile data. These circumstances progressively led to a 
paradigm shift, away from classical mutual legal assistance towards mutual recognition in the 
EU, and, more recently, direct cooperation between (foreign) service providers and LEAs. Yet, 
it often seems as if recent initiatives to enhance such informal law enforcement access to data 
held by private companies follow the credo ‘get access to lots of information at the lowest level 
of effort’. Moreover, this public-private relationship created a fragmented legal landscape and 
legal uncertainty, as service providers cooperate on a voluntary basis. This also means that, 
unless solutions are provided, states may be less and less in the position to maintain the rule of 
law to protect individuals and their rights in cyberspace.119 
The most recently proposed initiatives is the EU Commission’s Regulation on European 
Production and Preservation Orders is not a stand-alone element but follows a sequence of 
similar measures on different levels. 
The concept of enhancing already existing direct cooperation between LEAs and service 
providers commenced with Article 18 of the Cybercrime Convention on production orders and 
Article 32 on direct access, under which requesting parties can reach beyond the traditional 
borders of jurisdiction in order to obtain electronic evidence. These Articles are supposed to be 
supplemented by an Additional Protocol. The Cybercrime Convention serves as a guideline to 
develop comprehensive and harmonized national legislation against cybercrime and seeks to 
establish a framework for international cooperation between the Parties to the Convention. 
However, some states participating in the Cybercrime Convention such as Canada and the U.S. 
are not members to the CoE Convention 108 for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data120, which might cause problems in terms of data 
protection standards. 
                                                          
119 CoE: Enhanced international cooperation on cybercrime and electronic evidence: Towards a Protocol to the Budapest 
Convention, Version 19 March 2018, p. 2. 
120 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, ETS No.108, 
Strasbourg, 28/01/1981. Cf. on the recent update of this convention: Jörg Ukrow, ‘Practitioner’s Corner ∙ Data Protection 
without Frontiers? On the Relationship between EU GDPR and Amended CoE Convention 108’, European Data Protection 
Law Review (EDPL), Volume 4 (2018), Issue 2, Page 239 – 247. 
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Following the Microsoft case, the U.S. CLOUD Act became a subsequent piece of the puzzle, 
causing controversies with regard to the revision of executive agreements121, its complicated 
redress mechanisms and the involvement of companies like Microsoft in the lobbying of the 
bill. Under the CLOUD Act, it is likely that each individual EU Member State will enter into 
bilateral agreements, instead of one comprehensive agreement applicable to all Member States. 
These agreements will be based on an assessment of human rights standards in the respective 
country, which in the EU should (at least with regard to data protection) not create major 
concerns. However, where countries with rather low human rights standards can qualify for 
such agreements, harmonization might quickly be jeopardized and the question of reciprocity 
coming from other parts of the world could become a relevant challenge. 
The proposal for a Regulation on European Production and Preservation Orders is (for the time 
being) the final piece in the puzzle, although it is not at all clear yet what the final outcome of 
it will be after the legislative procedure is completed. Like the U.S. CLOUD Act and the 
provisions under the Cybercrime Convention, the EPO proposal allows the substitution of 
traditional MLA procedures for international cooperation on criminal law enforcement access 
to data, requiring service providers to comply with production orders regardless of where the 
data are stored. Moreover, all three initiatives offer unilateralism and therefore create more 
conflicts of laws where service providers responding to orders might not be in compliance with 
the laws of the host country. 
The extraterritorial effect of domestic production orders may thus, lead to complex issues if 
the relationships between the different instruments are not sufficiently well defined to prevent 
overlapping or contradiction. Thus, initiatives on different levels that are each applicable in 
their own corners may result in even more conflicts of laws than is currently the case, instead 
of removing the currently existing conflict of laws. 
Further questions remain with regard to handing previously judicial tasks of receiving orders 
to preserve or produce evidence over into the hands of private companies. This may also affect 
the admissibility of evidence in criminal proceedings. As the ECtHR pointed out in Gäfgen v. 
Germany: 
‘As to the examination of the nature of the Convention violation found, the Court 
reiterates that the question whether the use as evidence of information obtained in 
violation of Article 8 rendered a trial as a whole unfair contrary to Article 6 has to be 
determined with regard to all the circumstances of the case, including respect for the 
applicant’s defence rights and the quality and importance of the evidence in 
question’.122 
Although the initiatives are an attempt to creating a more harmonized framework for the fast 
gathering of electronic data (evidence), it should not be easy for LEAs to access and gather 
                                                          
121 However, some commentators argue that the process of certification appears to be a thorough one: in particular, to qualify 
for an agreement the US Attorney General must determine that a candidate country’s domestic law affords robust substantive 
and procedural protections for privacy and civil liberties, based on open criteria. See: Gavin Robinson, ‘Data Protection and 
the European Production Order for Electronic Evidence in Criminal Matters’ (Draft), May 2018. 
122 European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), Gäfgen v. Germany, Application no. 22978/05, 1 June 2010. 
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evidence, as there is a risk that data may become subject to abuse. Therefore, more discussion 
is needed into finding the adequate balance between both interests.  
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